I'm still a Coates fan, and I do disagree with Sanders' response to the reparations question - while also disagreeing with some of the specific criticisms of that response. But this is a thought-provoking, if slightly uneven, piece by Cedric Johnson; and Coates' reply is equally so (on both counts). To some extent, Coates is misinterpreting, and so talking past, Johnson; but Johnson bears some responsibility for that.
Johnson is trying to accomplish two conflicting tasks simultaneously: providing a Marxist critique of Coates' position, and defending Sanders' social democratic policy program against Coates' criticisms of Sanders.
The crucial line in Coates' piece is this: "But eventually, I came to believe that white supremacy was a force in and of itself, a vector often intersecting with class, but also operating independent of it."
There are two claims that need to be considered:
(1) White supremacy/institutional racism is an effective social force, the result of which is that black American poverty is significantly different than white American poverty; and
(2) White supremacy/institutional racism is independent of the class struggle.
Because Johnson is trying to defend Sanders, Coates takes him as denying both of these claims (although that's a little unfair at this point, given Sanders' response to his encounter with Black Lives Matter, namely, his development of far-and-away the most comprehensive plan for criminal justice reform); and Coates spends the first half of this piece defending his central thesis - thesis (1), the difference between white and black poverty - from Johnson, who does not, I think, mean to dispute it.
What Johnson, qua Marxist, does dispute is thesis (2). Coates may be right (almost certainly is right) that white supremacy/institutional racism would survive a series of social democratic reforms of the sort Sanders is advocating (and that remains true even if we include his criminal justice reforms). Johnson's position, again qua Marxist, on this point would have to be that it would not survive the abolition of private ownership of the means of production, because the class struggle is causally and explanatorily prior to white supremacy/institutional racism. Unlike non-hegemonic racism, which derives from the early hominid evolution of in-group/out-group dynamics, white supremacy/institutional racism is held up, as it were, by the fact that it serves the interests of economic power - which means, in the modern age, capital. The two best books on this are this one (from an econometric perspective) and this one (from a historical one). But it is impossible to stress this point in the context of a defense of Bernie Sanders' campaign, since Sanders is not running (this time) as an actual Marxist.
What Coates does not deal with is Johnson's critique of his alternative identity politics. Coates is unable to see that white supremacy/institutional racism would be unscathed by reparations in any form, or by any other action which he or anyone else might propose in the context of capitalist society, especially neoliberal capitalism. This is why the Marxist point about the causal and explanatory priority of the class struggle is important. It is Coates' greatest blind spot, as far as I'm concerned - his worst pieces, at least among all the ones I've read, are posts on his old Atlantic blog which defend the present day de facto requirement that writers be willing to work for free indefinitely if they really want a shot at "making it", and then having the opportunity to write for compensation.
One final complaint - Coates is self-consciously playing to an uninformed white audience with the digs he takes at Johnson's worries about the "Black managerial class". This is a persistent theme in the writing of black Marxists who are even deeper thinkers than either of them, like Adolph Reed, Jr (who subjects Coates' arguments to far more scathing critique than Johnson does).
Wednesday, 3 February 2016
The Realness of Donald Trump (If Not of the Political Pundit Class)
Brooks distills, as only he can, the most predictable and least informed media narrative, down to its essence.
The Trump scourge is by no means behind us, no matter how badly we may want it to be. In a year whose voter turnout shattered the previous record by 65,000 voters (a 50% increase), and saw nearly 85,000 first-time voters, Trump collected more first-time votes than any other GOP candidate. His people did turn out. His second-place finish was an under-performance only relative to the last two weeks of polling - a period during which Cruz, who already had the best turn-out operation by far and who had been the favorite in the polls - ran one of the dirtiest final-stage primary campaigns in recent history. The Evangelical winning Iowa isn't news. And Trump failing to get a larger portion of first-time voters than he did isn't news either. What is news is that he got more of them than anyone else, in a state that makes its voters caucus, despite running a fake campaign there - he didn't even have staffers telling people where to go vote! (The rest of that article is rubbish).
The unstated assumption is that after losing, a man who loves nothing so much as winning, who is all ego, and who has virtually unlimited funds, is not going to throw money at staffing and ad buys in the next several states where he has, and has long had, a commanding lead. The important - and frightening - but also interesting - question was never whether Trump could win the nomination without really campaigning; it is whether he'll win if he decides to start. Whether Trump starts winning or not is something he still has an enormous amount of control over, especially after giving the Republican side's best speech last night; it comes down to whether or not he's interested enough to stop running a fake campaign. That is the terrifying part.
Rubio's over-performance was big enough to be genuinely surprising, and his share of first-time voters does show real anti-Trump sentiment. But the fact that he collected that sentiment in Iowa, beyond the characteristics he shares with Cruz (who got a matching share), is down to his performance in the debate Trump skipped - and we can be sure that's a lesson The Donald has learned. Rubio's path to the nomination still absolutely relies on Bush, Christie, and Kasich dropping out (and Carson's voters splitting between Trump and Cruz after he leaves further complicates things). A lot of people seem sure that Bush will accept his walking papers from the Party because he's a company man; but he's also a Bush, which means he's a feuder and a grudge-holder, and right now his beef is with Rubio. I could see him bucking the Party merely to siphon off Rubio votes for as long as possible, purely out of spite. And he still has a lot of donor money. He also, along with Christie and Kasich, pretty much skipped Iowa, and Rubio has been polling miserably in New Hampshire. Christie isn't a company man and is already going after Rubio; and Kasich, besides being positioned for a strong showing next week (at least a strong third, just like Rubio got), may very well feel his highest obligation this year is to be the voice of moderation, and devil take the consequences.
There is no unity or sanity or normalcy here. Rubio is still in third, however you look at it. And even that is nothing to cheer about, because a Rubio presidency would only be marginally less disastrous than a Cruz or Trump one - and quite a bit more likely if he reaches the general. But that 'if' hasn't gotten much smaller.
Reports of the Republican Party's vitality are greatly exaggerated.
The Trump scourge is by no means behind us, no matter how badly we may want it to be. In a year whose voter turnout shattered the previous record by 65,000 voters (a 50% increase), and saw nearly 85,000 first-time voters, Trump collected more first-time votes than any other GOP candidate. His people did turn out. His second-place finish was an under-performance only relative to the last two weeks of polling - a period during which Cruz, who already had the best turn-out operation by far and who had been the favorite in the polls - ran one of the dirtiest final-stage primary campaigns in recent history. The Evangelical winning Iowa isn't news. And Trump failing to get a larger portion of first-time voters than he did isn't news either. What is news is that he got more of them than anyone else, in a state that makes its voters caucus, despite running a fake campaign there - he didn't even have staffers telling people where to go vote! (The rest of that article is rubbish).
The unstated assumption is that after losing, a man who loves nothing so much as winning, who is all ego, and who has virtually unlimited funds, is not going to throw money at staffing and ad buys in the next several states where he has, and has long had, a commanding lead. The important - and frightening - but also interesting - question was never whether Trump could win the nomination without really campaigning; it is whether he'll win if he decides to start. Whether Trump starts winning or not is something he still has an enormous amount of control over, especially after giving the Republican side's best speech last night; it comes down to whether or not he's interested enough to stop running a fake campaign. That is the terrifying part.
Rubio's over-performance was big enough to be genuinely surprising, and his share of first-time voters does show real anti-Trump sentiment. But the fact that he collected that sentiment in Iowa, beyond the characteristics he shares with Cruz (who got a matching share), is down to his performance in the debate Trump skipped - and we can be sure that's a lesson The Donald has learned. Rubio's path to the nomination still absolutely relies on Bush, Christie, and Kasich dropping out (and Carson's voters splitting between Trump and Cruz after he leaves further complicates things). A lot of people seem sure that Bush will accept his walking papers from the Party because he's a company man; but he's also a Bush, which means he's a feuder and a grudge-holder, and right now his beef is with Rubio. I could see him bucking the Party merely to siphon off Rubio votes for as long as possible, purely out of spite. And he still has a lot of donor money. He also, along with Christie and Kasich, pretty much skipped Iowa, and Rubio has been polling miserably in New Hampshire. Christie isn't a company man and is already going after Rubio; and Kasich, besides being positioned for a strong showing next week (at least a strong third, just like Rubio got), may very well feel his highest obligation this year is to be the voice of moderation, and devil take the consequences.
There is no unity or sanity or normalcy here. Rubio is still in third, however you look at it. And even that is nothing to cheer about, because a Rubio presidency would only be marginally less disastrous than a Cruz or Trump one - and quite a bit more likely if he reaches the general. But that 'if' hasn't gotten much smaller.
Reports of the Republican Party's vitality are greatly exaggerated.
Sunday, 31 January 2016
On "Serious" Critiques of Bernie Sanders' Health Plan
One - perhaps the most - important claim which is at least implicit in the "serious" critiques of Sanders' health plan is just false: It is not the case that under Medicare, a patient cannot be denied a treatment he/she wants. Medicare coverage is still subject to a "medically necessary and reasonable" standard - the latter part of which officially and explicitly involved subjective judgments of cost vs. chance of success until 2008, and I find it incredibly implausible to believe that it doesn't still effectively and implicitly involve such judgments on a day-to-day basis, at least for patients in demographics which are unlikely to be able to challenge decisions in court.
To sharpen the critique, the challenge should be posed in the form: will denials of treatment increase under a Sanders-style single-payer plan?
The analyses (like Thorpe's - which doesn't hold up) and the, to put it bluntly, ramblings (like Krugman's and Klein's), which answer in the affirmative are relying on two assumptions, one much-more-probably-than-not false, and one false to a practical certainty: the assumption of significantly increased demand (not borne out by reviewing the data from other jurisdictions), and the assumption of non-significantly increased bargaining power over the costs of drugs and medical supplies (whether because such power is simply assumed - obviously falsely - not to exist under single-payer systems in wealthy countries, or because a significant drop in willingness to supply is assumed contrary to all international evidence. This is actually more of a theological statement, or perhaps a superstitious one, than anything else; "Ooh, ooh, The Market won't like this...it will desert us!"). Furthermore, it is at least worth contemplating the potential for a cultural change in patterns of healthcare consumption in the US - a shift in preferences such that consumption becomes less wasteful - following (with some delay, of course), the major institutional shift to single-payer.
To spell out where Sanders is fudging (it has nothing to do with logical possibility or arithmetic, though yes, the campaign document did contain a faulty estimate of drug cost savings which needed to be updated): he isn't saying what denials of treatment would look like under single-payer vs. what they are under Medicare (or under the US healthcare system as a totality) now. There's no way to make a sound and relatively fine-grained prediction about that at this point.
But there are good reasons - the ones just stated - to think that denials will actually go down - certainly on the whole (that is, if we include denials of treatment by all insurers, public and private, under the current system), but even with respect to just Medicare as it currently exists. They won't go to zero, but they aren't at zero now.
The US does ration healthcare; it just uses different mechanisms than Canada and Europe (places where, incidentally, private clinics also exist - that's one of the biggest and most incomprehensible whoppers going around - and so, just like in the States, if you have the money, you can have whatever you want done right away). Rationing in the US is achieved via high costs of care - and that includes plenty of types of care that are covered under Medicare, but for which the program does not reimburse 100%.
And that's what really bugs me - as a citizen and resident of a single-payer country - about what's coming from Krugman, Klein, and plenty of others, at this point. Their opposition to Sanders and favoring of Clinton are driving them to embrace one of the greatest, most thoroughly debunked, bogeymen of the Right: "You don't want healthcare like they have up in Canada - they RATION!!! [cue scary music]" Yes, as does the US (even more so if we don't merely and unjustifiably define rationing in a way which excludes the mechanisms by which this is achieved in the US); but Canada does it in a way which delivers objectively superior health outcomes to a much larger percentage of the population at a much lower cost.
Before this election, no self-respecting progressive would have taken this seriously, let alone disseminated it.
To sharpen the critique, the challenge should be posed in the form: will denials of treatment increase under a Sanders-style single-payer plan?
The analyses (like Thorpe's - which doesn't hold up) and the, to put it bluntly, ramblings (like Krugman's and Klein's), which answer in the affirmative are relying on two assumptions, one much-more-probably-than-not false, and one false to a practical certainty: the assumption of significantly increased demand (not borne out by reviewing the data from other jurisdictions), and the assumption of non-significantly increased bargaining power over the costs of drugs and medical supplies (whether because such power is simply assumed - obviously falsely - not to exist under single-payer systems in wealthy countries, or because a significant drop in willingness to supply is assumed contrary to all international evidence. This is actually more of a theological statement, or perhaps a superstitious one, than anything else; "Ooh, ooh, The Market won't like this...it will desert us!"). Furthermore, it is at least worth contemplating the potential for a cultural change in patterns of healthcare consumption in the US - a shift in preferences such that consumption becomes less wasteful - following (with some delay, of course), the major institutional shift to single-payer.
To spell out where Sanders is fudging (it has nothing to do with logical possibility or arithmetic, though yes, the campaign document did contain a faulty estimate of drug cost savings which needed to be updated): he isn't saying what denials of treatment would look like under single-payer vs. what they are under Medicare (or under the US healthcare system as a totality) now. There's no way to make a sound and relatively fine-grained prediction about that at this point.
But there are good reasons - the ones just stated - to think that denials will actually go down - certainly on the whole (that is, if we include denials of treatment by all insurers, public and private, under the current system), but even with respect to just Medicare as it currently exists. They won't go to zero, but they aren't at zero now.
The US does ration healthcare; it just uses different mechanisms than Canada and Europe (places where, incidentally, private clinics also exist - that's one of the biggest and most incomprehensible whoppers going around - and so, just like in the States, if you have the money, you can have whatever you want done right away). Rationing in the US is achieved via high costs of care - and that includes plenty of types of care that are covered under Medicare, but for which the program does not reimburse 100%.
And that's what really bugs me - as a citizen and resident of a single-payer country - about what's coming from Krugman, Klein, and plenty of others, at this point. Their opposition to Sanders and favoring of Clinton are driving them to embrace one of the greatest, most thoroughly debunked, bogeymen of the Right: "You don't want healthcare like they have up in Canada - they RATION!!! [cue scary music]" Yes, as does the US (even more so if we don't merely and unjustifiably define rationing in a way which excludes the mechanisms by which this is achieved in the US); but Canada does it in a way which delivers objectively superior health outcomes to a much larger percentage of the population at a much lower cost.
Before this election, no self-respecting progressive would have taken this seriously, let alone disseminated it.
Friday, 15 January 2016
Wednesday, 30 December 2015
Tamir Rice, Gun Laws, and American Apartheid
Esquire has a great essay on the unresolvable tension between American gun laws and American policing of minority communities.
This is the issue I've been harping on since John Crawford, but even here - the piece closest to the heart of the matter, at least among those that I've seen - an insufficiently fine point is put on it.
What is the theory of law here?
Video evidence makes crystal clear that neither Crawford nor Rice - the latter of whom was perceived to be of legal age for owning a firearm by the officer - was "brandishing" a weapon, in the technical sense of that term. Both were carrying what were perceived to be firearms. Ohio is a permissive preemptive open carry state. This means that a) both were perceived to be performing actions which, had they actually been performing them, would have been exercises of their federal, state and municipal rights; and b) as a consequence, police orders to relinquish their (perceived) weapons were unlawful. So there are only two possible theories of law here: 1) the second amendment and state gun possession laws do not apply to black people; or 2) it is objectively reasonable for police offers to use lethal force against black people when they exercise their legal rights, if those officers feel subjectively threatened by that exercise.
The argument that it was objectively reasonable to believe that either of them were in the course of committing, or intending to commit, a crime, takes us no further. It implies that under American law, the subjective impressions of a complaining civilian suffice as the basis for such an objectively reasonable belief about a black person, even though no feature of the scene itself at the time police arrive supports this, and multiple features count against it.
We are seeing, with alarming frequency, evidence that the U.S. Is in fact an apartheid regime - as it would have to be in order to reconcile the absurd permissiveness of gun laws as written with the actual motivation for those laws. Why can't anyone see/admit this? When will we be able to have a public conversation about the reality that this is, de facto, contemporary American law?
This is the issue I've been harping on since John Crawford, but even here - the piece closest to the heart of the matter, at least among those that I've seen - an insufficiently fine point is put on it.
What is the theory of law here?
Video evidence makes crystal clear that neither Crawford nor Rice - the latter of whom was perceived to be of legal age for owning a firearm by the officer - was "brandishing" a weapon, in the technical sense of that term. Both were carrying what were perceived to be firearms. Ohio is a permissive preemptive open carry state. This means that a) both were perceived to be performing actions which, had they actually been performing them, would have been exercises of their federal, state and municipal rights; and b) as a consequence, police orders to relinquish their (perceived) weapons were unlawful. So there are only two possible theories of law here: 1) the second amendment and state gun possession laws do not apply to black people; or 2) it is objectively reasonable for police offers to use lethal force against black people when they exercise their legal rights, if those officers feel subjectively threatened by that exercise.
The argument that it was objectively reasonable to believe that either of them were in the course of committing, or intending to commit, a crime, takes us no further. It implies that under American law, the subjective impressions of a complaining civilian suffice as the basis for such an objectively reasonable belief about a black person, even though no feature of the scene itself at the time police arrive supports this, and multiple features count against it.
We are seeing, with alarming frequency, evidence that the U.S. Is in fact an apartheid regime - as it would have to be in order to reconcile the absurd permissiveness of gun laws as written with the actual motivation for those laws. Why can't anyone see/admit this? When will we be able to have a public conversation about the reality that this is, de facto, contemporary American law?
Tuesday, 8 December 2015
Is Donald Trump an Embryonic Fascist?
It may be true that despite his national poll numbers, Donald Trump doesn't have a realistic chance at winning the GOP nomination. But even if that's the case, focusing on that purported fact buries the lede. Because we have to ask, if the 5-months-and-counting front-runner isn't going to win, who is? And the answer that is beginning to emerge - as Ben Carson watches the floor disappear beneath his feet, and more and more people realize that Marco Rubio is running for president because he needs the money - is Ted Cruz.
And that would be unthinkable without Trump pushing this primary as far to the right as it is possible, under current historical, economic, and socio-cultural conditions, for it to go. So anyone (and I'm looking at you, Nate Silver), who thinks that the real story here is that so many people are taking Trump seriously when he really doesn't have a prayer: No, the story is the extent to which he is changing this race; the story is that he is handing it to a candidate who is only nominally a member of the establishment, who would be far too radical to be taken seriously, let alone to be where the smart money is going, if not for the profound effect Trump is having on the shape of the race, and on American politics and political discourse in general right now. With Trump, we are honest-to-God talking about a leading candidate for the American presidency, regarding whom the question "Is he a fascist?" is an intricate and academic one - unless of course you write for Wonkblog, in which case you've never met a question that can't be answered with a five-point list or a single graph, because you are in fact so simple-minded it beggars belief. And the argument that Trump isn't a facist, but is rather a right-wing nativist populist - which is expounded in the above-linked text with admirable sophistication, though it is probably unreasonable to expect that level of sophistication in governing the ordinary use of the term 'fascist' - isn't even wholly convincing, resting as it does on (a) the fact that Trump does not - yet - command a private paramilitary force (or does he?); and (b) armchair psychological speculation regarding what the man does and does not believe as a matter of principle.
But in any case, in this, his most recent and most facism-adjacent policy proposal to date, the mildest response by far, not even approaching a condemnation, has come from Cruz - a man who is universally reviled in Washington, even by the other members of his own party. So if (when?), he secures the nomination, I sure as hell better not see any stories to the effect that "We told you so, the establishment wins again." Ted Cruz is not, by any but the thinnest and most useless of definitions, a member of any "establishment"; and a victory for him would confirm, within the margin of error, the claim that Trump has had an indelible impact on this race. Spend some time really thinking about what that says about the American electorate - or at least, the half being pandered to in this increasingly nightmarish clown show.
And then, of course, there is the in-fact-not-at-all-insignificant chance, against which this summer's nay-sayers have already begun to hedge, that Trump will win the nomination, because, as we apparently failed to learn from the greatest economic crisis in 75 years, predictions based on purportedly sophisticated statistical reasoning, which tacitly assumes that the future will be fundamentally similar to the recent past, can, after all, lead us horribly astray.
There is one good argument against calling Trump and his campaign fascist: that, despite wanton disregard for the Constitution with respect to policy proposals, they are not explicitly anti-democratic. It is worth remembering that from 1920 to 1932, the NSDAP (the Nazis) participated in several democratic parliamentary elections. And the 25 point party program speech which Hitler gave in 1920 did not advocate abolishing democracy or one-party rule - though it did implicitly advocate repealing the Weimar Constitution through its call for the Reichstag to have unlimited law-making authority, and called for all government offices to be restricted to native born "Aryan" Germans. So, by this argument, Hitler and the Nazis were not fascists until 1932/33. They were, in essence, right-wing nativist populists who took the further step of calling for an apartheid regime. Now, maybe that's right and maybe it's useful to define fascism in that way, so that by the definition they became fascists when they seized absolute power (after winning an election). But in that case, it is of no practical interest in itself that Trump and his campaign are not currently fascist.
If Trump, once elected, would become explicitly anti-democratic, then he and his campaign are on the road to fascism, they just haven't reached the destination yet, because they are not yet in position to seize power (not having yet won an election). If that is even remotely possible, there is no reason to police the use of the term 'fascist' in this context, as some seem to want to do. Whether it is remotely possible or not depends on what Trump privately believes; and so this argument may just collapse into the second one mentioned above.
For anyone who thinks that this isn't even remotely possible, either for reasons having to do with Trump or for reasons having to do with America, consider this.
And that would be unthinkable without Trump pushing this primary as far to the right as it is possible, under current historical, economic, and socio-cultural conditions, for it to go. So anyone (and I'm looking at you, Nate Silver), who thinks that the real story here is that so many people are taking Trump seriously when he really doesn't have a prayer: No, the story is the extent to which he is changing this race; the story is that he is handing it to a candidate who is only nominally a member of the establishment, who would be far too radical to be taken seriously, let alone to be where the smart money is going, if not for the profound effect Trump is having on the shape of the race, and on American politics and political discourse in general right now. With Trump, we are honest-to-God talking about a leading candidate for the American presidency, regarding whom the question "Is he a fascist?" is an intricate and academic one - unless of course you write for Wonkblog, in which case you've never met a question that can't be answered with a five-point list or a single graph, because you are in fact so simple-minded it beggars belief. And the argument that Trump isn't a facist, but is rather a right-wing nativist populist - which is expounded in the above-linked text with admirable sophistication, though it is probably unreasonable to expect that level of sophistication in governing the ordinary use of the term 'fascist' - isn't even wholly convincing, resting as it does on (a) the fact that Trump does not - yet - command a private paramilitary force (or does he?); and (b) armchair psychological speculation regarding what the man does and does not believe as a matter of principle.
But in any case, in this, his most recent and most facism-adjacent policy proposal to date, the mildest response by far, not even approaching a condemnation, has come from Cruz - a man who is universally reviled in Washington, even by the other members of his own party. So if (when?), he secures the nomination, I sure as hell better not see any stories to the effect that "We told you so, the establishment wins again." Ted Cruz is not, by any but the thinnest and most useless of definitions, a member of any "establishment"; and a victory for him would confirm, within the margin of error, the claim that Trump has had an indelible impact on this race. Spend some time really thinking about what that says about the American electorate - or at least, the half being pandered to in this increasingly nightmarish clown show.
And then, of course, there is the in-fact-not-at-all-insignificant chance, against which this summer's nay-sayers have already begun to hedge, that Trump will win the nomination, because, as we apparently failed to learn from the greatest economic crisis in 75 years, predictions based on purportedly sophisticated statistical reasoning, which tacitly assumes that the future will be fundamentally similar to the recent past, can, after all, lead us horribly astray.
There is one good argument against calling Trump and his campaign fascist: that, despite wanton disregard for the Constitution with respect to policy proposals, they are not explicitly anti-democratic. It is worth remembering that from 1920 to 1932, the NSDAP (the Nazis) participated in several democratic parliamentary elections. And the 25 point party program speech which Hitler gave in 1920 did not advocate abolishing democracy or one-party rule - though it did implicitly advocate repealing the Weimar Constitution through its call for the Reichstag to have unlimited law-making authority, and called for all government offices to be restricted to native born "Aryan" Germans. So, by this argument, Hitler and the Nazis were not fascists until 1932/33. They were, in essence, right-wing nativist populists who took the further step of calling for an apartheid regime. Now, maybe that's right and maybe it's useful to define fascism in that way, so that by the definition they became fascists when they seized absolute power (after winning an election). But in that case, it is of no practical interest in itself that Trump and his campaign are not currently fascist.
If Trump, once elected, would become explicitly anti-democratic, then he and his campaign are on the road to fascism, they just haven't reached the destination yet, because they are not yet in position to seize power (not having yet won an election). If that is even remotely possible, there is no reason to police the use of the term 'fascist' in this context, as some seem to want to do. Whether it is remotely possible or not depends on what Trump privately believes; and so this argument may just collapse into the second one mentioned above.
For anyone who thinks that this isn't even remotely possible, either for reasons having to do with Trump or for reasons having to do with America, consider this.
Thursday, 12 November 2015
The Protests at Yale
The first point I want
to makes about the student protests currently being held on the Yale campus, which have as their most proximate cause Prof. Christakis' email about offensive Haloween costumes, is that the "this isn't really about the email" argument seems
not only weak, but disrespectful to the students involved. Yes, the evidence
indicates that there are other serious matters going on at Yale, which merit
strong protest, prompt administrative response, and decisive change. But the
idea that the protests aimed at these professors - and it is not in dispute
that there are protests aimed specifically at these professors, and
specifically in response to this email - are themselves "really
about" the other things going on, turns the students who are protesting
these professors in response to this email into petulant children - taking out
their understandable and justifiable frustrations about other things on the
most recent and most convenient, but not directly related, target. So I'm not
going to address that point, because I can't see how it cuts any ice.
Having read the email
in question carefully several times, it seems to me to make the following three
points - or at least to contain the seeds of them, since each is not fully
developed. 1) There is good reason to doubt the competence of administrative
authority to determine what is and is not offensive (notwithstanding
that what came from the administration was a "suggestion" rather than
a rule or policy - suggestions from high-ranking administrators are not
ordinary suggestions); 2) the contemporary
concept of cultural appropriation is problematic - it is an amorphous mass
which has swallowed up the clearly important and reasonably well-defined notion
of harmful cultural misrepresentation, and a discussion about how its
boundaries should be determined is one that needs to be had; 3) even if
administrative authority is competent to determine what is offensive and what
is not, any administrative policy which succeeds at restricting everything
offensive will almost inevitably cast too wide a net, and restrict forms of
expression which, though transgressive, are also genuinely valuable in one way
or another.
Now, my own view is
that these three points are actually correct - but nothing I have to say
depends on that (although I will delve a bit more deeply into 2) below). It is,
at the very least, not out of the question that they are reasonable; and
likewise, it is not by any means a foregone conclusion that they are themselves
offensive or intolerant. Acknowledging this point does not imply that one
cannot recognize the potential for harm in another person's choice of Halloween
costume - that potential certainly exists, against the social, cultural, and
historical background of contemporary America. It does not even imply that one
cannot recognize the possibility of costumes so virulently racist that a
punitive response on the part of the administration would be appropriate. But
such situations already fall within the purview of existing codes of conduct at
virtually all American universities.
There are two aspects
of the specific response by students to these professors caused by this email
which I want to discuss. The first is the desire for the administration to take
on the role of determining and discouraging the offensive - the desire which
point 1) above calls into question. I believe I understand the motivation
behind this desire - the daily lived exhaustion, physical, emotional and
cognitive, of living within social structures infected with systemic
oppression. The weight of that consideration should by no means be
underestimated. But the question which at least has to be asked is whether a
society in which administrative authority plays this role is part of the just
society we should be working toward, or is even a likely transitional step on
the way to a just society. The reason this question is so important is that,
even if we conclude that a university administration ought to play this role on
a college campus, it is seriously in doubt whether the State should play an
analogous role in society at large. And the interactions between university
students and university administration is, quite appropriately, a training
ground for the relationship between responsible citizens and the State. This
point does not place the responsibility for fighting oppression solely on the
shoulders of the oppressed - all students, and likewise all citizens, bear that
responsibility, though the question of how to organize and coordinate the
efforts of those who are directly affected and those who are not is an
incredibly difficult one. The point about the importance of carefully
considering, questioning, and debating the appropriate role of authority
remains.
The second is the
nature of the protest directly aimed at the professors, demanding their
resignation in the event that the administration should fail to remove them.
The troubling feature of this protest its unwillingness to engage in even
forceful debate on the basis of reasons - more than this, its explicit and
self-conscious rejection of the appropriateness of this in the present context.
This applies even to the formal letter calling for the resignation, which
manifestly mischaracterizes the content of the email it is a response to. But
it applies far more to the preceding and ongoing campus protests. These are
marked by a feature which has become a disturbing trend, an equating of
disagreement itself with disrespect, a demand for apology in response to
something which has caused emotional pain, which cannot even countenance the
possibility that act which caused the pain was not wrong, that not every act
which causes emotional pain is thereby wrong. This point brings us to a very
thorny issue of epistemic authority. We can, should, and must recognize the
epistemic authority of oppressed individuals and communities in relating both
the events which mark their lives and their physical, mental, and emotional
experiences of these events. This authority has not been recognized throughout
American history, and today change on this front is thus far slight and
excruciatingly slow. I do not doubt for a moment the reality of the pain being
experienced by these students, or the fact that the email in question is the
proximate cause. I recognize their epistemic authority on these points. But
these descriptive questions must be distinguished from two normative questions
(I use the term "normative" in its philosophical sense). The issue of
epistemic authority on normative matters is much trickier than it is on
descriptive matters; and it is not at all clear that the one translates into
the other in the matters at hand - that is yet another question which must be
open for honest and critical reflection and debate. The first normative
question is the individual-level one of whether this pain - the self-reported
inability to eat, sleep, attend class or do homework on the part of some
student residents of this college - is reasonable.
Now, the very questioning of
the reasonableness of the emotional response to a specific perceived act of
oppression by those who live within social structures which do systematically
oppress them is incredibly fraught - the real and horrifying history of
gaslighting makes this so. But to permanently place this question out of bounds
is dangerous, in both the short-term and the long-term. First, doing so
excludes the emotional responses of the oppressed from the realm of reason - it
may look superficially as if what is being asserted is that all such responses
are reasonable, but when we assert that something must be reasonable whatever
its content may be, what we are actually doing is placing it outside of the
realm of reason altogether. Some may think it obvious that the experience of
emotional pain is outside the realm of reason; but there is in fact a large
literature on emotional responses as a species of value judgment, and thus
subject to standards of reasonableness - one of my professors, Robert Solomon,
who passed long before his time, did much outstanding work on this topic.
Second, it preempts much needed conversations about the genuine reasonableness
of extreme responses in extreme circumstances - most notably the reasonableness
under currently obtaining circumstances of expressing outrage through rioting,
including property damage. As unpopular an opinion as this is, I think that
such a response is not only understandable, or excusable (which is the
strongest position I've seen even in the progressive media), but under
circumstances which do actually obtain today, genuinely reasonable and
justifiable - though I fear that to expand on this point would take us deeper
into Marxist territory than most are comfortable with. Third, it preempts much
needed discussion on a general level of the precise goals of social justice.
Central to one such discussion is the concept of cultural appropriation, the
contemporary interpretation of which is called into question in the email.
Consider the following thought, which I arrived at independently but have since
seen articulated by thinkers as profound as Adolph Reed, Jr., who has become
one of my own intellectual heroes: the contemporary concept of cultural
appropriation, in its radical expansion of the older notion of harmful cultural
misrepresentation, has reduced the institutions, traditions, and artifacts of
all the world's cultures to the category of property subject to theft, as this
is understood in the Anglo-Saxon common law tradition. That reductive
categorization demands an answer to the question of who owns this sort of
property, a question which is designed for an answer with fine bright lines,
and the only plausible candidate answer which purports to have sharp enough
boundaries is that cultures are the product of "races" (the scare
quotes indicate my own belief that this is a fictive construct), and thus
"races" are the owners of the cultural property which may be
"appropriated"--i.e. stolen. Reed cites the outstanding work of
Walter Benn Michaels in this connection –
- and quite correctly,
in my view, casts the "identarianism" of which this understanding of
appropriation is a symptom as the left-wing of neoliberalism.
Thus, far from being an essential component of social justice, concern for
cultural appropriation as it is currently understood turns out to be a symptom
of conceptual imperialism, all the more insidious for the inability of those
who wield the concept to recognize this. This is my own view; but I do not
claim to know it for a certainty. Rather, it is an example of a conversation which
I believe is desperately needed, but which is excluded from conversation by an
ideology which does not allow the reasonableness of offense to be scrutinized
under any circumstances. Such an ideology blinds us to what is problematic
about the very concepts being used to interpret the offense, which may
themselves be far more harmful than the actual actions which count as offensive
under that conceptual regime. And fourth, it preempts a much needed
conversation about whether these students have been failed by their
universities, their highschool and primary teachers, their parents, their
purported role models in the struggle for social justice, and society at large,
in being prepared for adulthood. The real and serious experience of these
students in response to this email, the experience of not being able to eat,
sleep, or work, in response to the expression of three reasonable and
respectful (but by no means inarguable) opinions - we must ask the question of
whether it is the experience of fully functioning, psychologically healthy
adults, even against a background of systematic social oppression. Not having
that discussion means missing multiple opportunities to address real problems
in our society, problems related to the pressures of childhood and young adulthood
under neoliberal capitalism, the demand for academic perfection coupled with
the complete lack of basic security in life even following on the attainment of
that alleged perfection, and the economic policy landscape that has created a
world in which the children of the middle class must push themselves to the
breaking point and beyond in order to have any hope of remaining middle class.
The second normative
question is the public-level one of whether the response - the demand for
resignation or firing - is reasonable. Here again, there is no obvious claim to
epistemic authority; instead, there is a debate which needs to be had, and the
dangers of an ideology which cannot see that, which cannot see where epistemic
authority is not present while it fights for recognition in those arenas where
it is.
All of this is to say
that these students are not simply fighting for a basic right in the language
of "safe spaces". The language, and the idea, of safe spaces is more
powerful, pervasive, and pernicious than they are often made out to be. There
are real issues, relating to questions of the appropriate limits on authority,
the means and ends of social justice, and the concepts we use to interpret the
world and our interactions with each other. In some cases, I see worrisome
answers being given by this generation; and in others, I see a dangerous
failure to engage in, or even recognize the appropriateness of, passionate -
and as passionate as you like, you won't hear any criticisms of tone from me -
but still reasoned debate.
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