The death of US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has occasioned widely differing appraisals of his judicial legacy. But one difficulty which they all run up against, regardless of their scholarly, ideological, or political perspective, is the vast and pervasive set of ambiguities found in descriptions of Scalia's methodological approach to the interpretation of legal texts - including his own.
Here is an attempt at a bit of housekeeping.
The first point to be made is that we should dispense immediately with the term "Textualism", as it is utterly uninformative.
Progress then depends on clearly drawing a series of distinctions:
Originalism vs. (for lack of a better word) Contemporaneanism
Intent vs. Plain- (or Ordinary-) meaning vs. Audience-understanding
Literalism vs. (again for lack of a better word) Reasonablism
The first two sets of distinctions cut across one another.
We could be Intentionalists, and take the meaning of a legal text to be determined by the linguistic intentions of the text's author(s) - and here is an important and thorny complication, as modern legal texts must be seen as having either group authorship, or institutional authorship, where an institutional author is a kind of fiction - at the time the text was authored (in which case we would be Originalists, and more specifically Intent-Originalists); or, we could take the meaning to be what the author(s) would most probably, on the balance of whatever evidence is available, intend for the words they wrote to mean if they had written them today.
Likewise, we can take the meaning of the text as being whatever its plain meaning was at the time it was written, or as being what its plain meaning is today.
Finally, we can take the meaning of legal texts as being what, on the balance of evidence, their original audience understood or interpreted them as being - in the case of the Articles and Amendments of the US Constitution, that would be the (multiple) understanding(s) of the State legislatures - as groups or as institutions - which ratified them; or, we can take the meaning of legal texts as being whatever a contemporary reasonable and informed person would interpret it as being.
Literalism and Reasonablism are subtypes of a Plain-meaning approach to interpretation, which become relevant when the text to be interpreted is ambiguous or vague - i.e. when it has no plain meaning.
The Literalist will insist (as the moniker suggests) on a (maximally) literal interpretation of the text (however bizarre such an interpretation might be in context), on the assumption that there is always a single (most) literal interpretation, however ambiguous or vague a text may be. This literal interpretation could be an interpretation given the literal meanings of the words used at the time of authorship, or in the present day.
The Reasonablist, on the other hand, will revert to a version of the Audience-understanding interpretive approach at this point, and take the text to mean what a reasonable and relevantly informed person - that is, one who is linguistically informed about the text, who is familiar with any technical or specialized vocabulary, archaic uses and meanings of words, unusual phrases, rare grammatical constructions, etc. - either at the time the text was authored, or in the present day, would interpret it as meaning. Being informed, for the purposes of this interpretive theory, does not extend to having knowledge of the deliberative history of the text's production, the express or implied intentions of its authors, its most likely purpose given the socio-cultural-politico-economic context in which it was written, etc. And, since Reasonablism is a subtype of the Plain-meaning interpretive approach, it conceives of a purely hypothetical reasonable and informed person, and is not concerned with the actual understanding of any person, group, or institution, historical or contemporary - unlike a pure Audience-understanding theory.
A term which is frequently bandied about without being precisely defined is "Strict Constructionism". The closest we can come to a precise definition of it is: (a) the approach to the interpretation of legal texts which embraces Plain-meaning interpretation in the absence of vagueness or ambiguity; and (b) Literalism in the presence of vagueness or ambiguity. Strict Constructionists could, in theory, have either original or contemporary meaning in mind, since that distinction is, again, orthogonal to the others.
With all these distinctions in place, we can finally identify Scalia's (purported) approach to the interpretation of law: Plain-meaning-Originalism, Reasonablism sub-type. Whether he consistently adhered to that approach is another question entirely.
For the critic of Scalia's legacy - and I count myself as one - there are four main problems with the corpus of judicial decisions he leaves behind.
The first problem is the incredibly problematic assumption that, when a legal text does not have an (obviously, self-evidently) "plain" meaning, there is such a thing as the interpretation which a reasonable and informed person would give of it. See, for example, Richard Posner's blistering critique of Scalia's interpretation of the word "sandwich".
Understanding the second problem requires one more distinction: that between the interpretation of a legal text (which is all we've talked about thus far), and the application of the text's meaning to a question before the court.
For many legal controversies which were not foreseen by anyone at the time that the laws which would eventually become relevant to them were written - such as the controversy over affirmative action laws and public policies - neither the original plain-meaning of the legal text (if there is one), nor the reasonable and informed person's interpretation of it at the time it was authored (if there isn't), provides anything approaching determinate guidance of how the contemporary question is to be resolved. Accusations of Scalia's pomposity are justified by his capacity to support his (politically or religiously) preferred applications of the law by mere bluster, when the actual results of his (professed) interpretive method are entirely indeterminate.
This is in sharp contrast to other, non-Originalist interpretive approaches, such as Joseph Raz's Moderate Actual Institutional Authorial Intent approach, and Aharon Barak's Purposive approach, for which problems of contemporary application are much less severe.
The third is a problem not with Scalia's method itself, but with his execution of it: the fact that he - like many others - often did such a shoddy job of the historical linguistic work on which that approach depends, in order to create an illusion of legal justification for a preferred conclusion. Nowhere was that unfortunate tendency more egregiously displayed than in his majority opinion on gun control.
The fourth, and largest, problem is a philosophical/normative difficulty with Scalia's theory - a problem from an external perspective, rather than a problem of the theory's internal cogency, its applicability, or his execution of it.
There are good reasons - set out in the works linked to above, among other places, for rejecting the idea that the task of interpreting legal texts is a search for their plain meaning; rather, it is a search for something like their purpose, an understanding of what problem they set out to solve, and why they set out to solve it in that way.
Friday, 19 February 2016
Thursday, 18 February 2016
Say it with me now...
Underutilized productive capacity!
(OK, so it's not a great slogan.)
Nonetheless - here's a sharp, intellectually responsible piece on the potential for Bernie Sanders' suite of economic policy proposals to stimulate growth, which makes clear why Gerald Friedman's estimates aren't nearly as insane or magical as so many wonks and pundits seem to believe.
If only we could expect the same from those who disagree - you know, data, analysis, arguments, stuff like that, instead of emotional outbursts and authority-based proclamations.
(OK, so it's not a great slogan.)
Nonetheless - here's a sharp, intellectually responsible piece on the potential for Bernie Sanders' suite of economic policy proposals to stimulate growth, which makes clear why Gerald Friedman's estimates aren't nearly as insane or magical as so many wonks and pundits seem to believe.
If only we could expect the same from those who disagree - you know, data, analysis, arguments, stuff like that, instead of emotional outbursts and authority-based proclamations.
Tuesday, 16 February 2016
David Brooks on Dealing with "Disaster"
This is utterly fascinating - psychologically, sociologically, anthropologically, economically, and politically. Not for anything Brooks means to say, mind you, but for the fact that he is capable - without effort, hesitation, or detectable shame - of classifying the purposeful structural and institutional consequences of neoliberal capitalism as "natural disasters"; and then suggesting, wholly unselfconsciously, that the sensible way to deal with these "disasters" is to elect a US president who has no interest whatsoever in challenging that ideology.
Monday, 15 February 2016
This time he's gone too far! - No, wait, really, we mean it, this is really it...
It is time once again to wonder:
Does anyone know less about American politics than Yglesias?
Read here to find out who was booing Trump at the debate.
Read here to find out who Trump was addressing and who he cares about reaching (spoiler: not the people who were booing).
Read here for a reminder of the fact that this issue has already come up - 4 months ago - and it made no difference to the GOP primary.
Update 02/18: And indeed, it doesn't seem to be making a difference this time either.
Does anyone know less about American politics than Yglesias?
Read here to find out who was booing Trump at the debate.
Read here to find out who Trump was addressing and who he cares about reaching (spoiler: not the people who were booing).
Read here for a reminder of the fact that this issue has already come up - 4 months ago - and it made no difference to the GOP primary.
Update 02/18: And indeed, it doesn't seem to be making a difference this time either.
Thursday, 11 February 2016
Re-thinking Donald Trump
This is definitely worth taking seriously.
But, if you
(1) don't think he would have any shot in the general against anyone;
(2) do think that he isn't really an embryonic fascist after all, but just playing one on TV until he wraps up the nomination; and
(3) take a moment to reflect on the fact that he isn't just better than Cruz, he's likely better than 10 out of the 16 other past-or-present GOP candidates (including Rubio), who only look like they're not nightmarishly insane/incompetent compared to Cruz, and are probably even more so than Trump once point (2) is factored in;
- then you might want to take this (fairly long but really excellent) piece just as seriously.
For this reason above all else:
"When Trump’s presidential rivals attended a David and Charles Koch retreat, he tweeted: 'I wish good luck to all of the Republican candidates that traveled to California to beg for money etc. from the Koch brothers. Puppets?'"
But, if you
(1) don't think he would have any shot in the general against anyone;
(2) do think that he isn't really an embryonic fascist after all, but just playing one on TV until he wraps up the nomination; and
(3) take a moment to reflect on the fact that he isn't just better than Cruz, he's likely better than 10 out of the 16 other past-or-present GOP candidates (including Rubio), who only look like they're not nightmarishly insane/incompetent compared to Cruz, and are probably even more so than Trump once point (2) is factored in;
- then you might want to take this (fairly long but really excellent) piece just as seriously.
For this reason above all else:
"When Trump’s presidential rivals attended a David and Charles Koch retreat, he tweeted: 'I wish good luck to all of the Republican candidates that traveled to California to beg for money etc. from the Koch brothers. Puppets?'"
Wednesday, 10 February 2016
The Lessons of This Election
"Perhaps the most puzzled by what they’re seeing is the conservative movement old guard who spent decades creating the organizations that in recent years have risen up to challenge the Republican elites for supremacy of the party. They have made great strides, primarying apostates, defeating RINOs and even taking out good conservatives just to show they could. They showed the entire country that they are willing to destroy the government itself if that’s what it takes to demonstrate their commitment to their principles. They take no prisoners, give no quarter. And finally, after decades of hard work and strategizing, they are on the verge of total dominance.
Or they were until Trump came along and proved that many of the people they had been counting on to be the foot soldiers in this conservative revolution weren’t paying attention."
- Digby
Amazingly, there seem to be intelligent, educated, well-read people who don't see this - who don't get that Trump is currently teaching the single biggest and most interesting lesson about American politics today. For crying out loud, pull up a chair.
A significant percentage of the people we thought were principled believers in limited government or constitutional originalism - or steadfast adherents to a strict religious litmus test for politicians and policy - just aren't.
We believed they were because there are small groups of incredibly wealthy people who are these things, and who have been able to prevent an alternative from emerging - until now. Now that smokescreen has cleared. We can see that many people are not who we thought they were. They are something else entirely.
What? I'm not totally sure. Lots of different things. Let's just hope there's something in all that anger that can eventually be redirected towards good. One thing they are is cool with Trump's very unconservative economic views. Another thing they are is in open rebellion against neoliberal orthodoxy, the dominant socio-politico-economic ideology of our time, having finally figured out that its promised benefits will never reach them.
Those are reasons to hold out hope - assuming they can be weaned off the noxious xenophobia of Trump's right-wing populism/nationalism without losing those more open and flexible attitudes towards the structure of the economy and the role of the State, attitudes which the conservative establishment has successfully smothered for a generation.
If Trump loses the nomination and Sanders wins it, this group may prove a surprising source of defectors to the progressive - anti-establishment, anti-Washington-consensus - cause. If Trump wins the nomination, he may even start that weaning process himself among his own original base of supporters, in order to maximize his appeal in the general election. And when he (all but certainly) loses the election, there'll be a large block of GOP voters which, starting in 2017, could find a surprising home in a Democratic Party that manages to move away from present-day establishment orthodoxy. Even if that move is well to the political and economic left.
But that Democratic Party doesn't exist yet. It needs to be built from the ground up starting now. And that's precisely the movement that Bernie Sanders is leading.
If Trump is teaching us a fascinating lesson about right-of-center voters, Sanders is teaching an (almost) equally fascinating and complementary one about centrist and left-of-center ones. Namely, that no one has a goddamn clue what people mean when they describe themselves as "moderate".
Moderate Democrats are voting for Sanders. Conservative Democrats are voting for Sanders. Blue-collar Democrats are voting for Sanders. Independents are voting for Sanders.
Whatever "moderate" means in 2016, it does not preclude favoring a revolution to smash the stranglehold that neoliberal and neoconservative policy thought currently have on the ideas and agendas of both major political parties.
Nate Silver (unintentionally) said it best: What he - and everyone else, myself certainly included - don't get, could fill a book.
Or they were until Trump came along and proved that many of the people they had been counting on to be the foot soldiers in this conservative revolution weren’t paying attention."
- Digby
Amazingly, there seem to be intelligent, educated, well-read people who don't see this - who don't get that Trump is currently teaching the single biggest and most interesting lesson about American politics today. For crying out loud, pull up a chair.
A significant percentage of the people we thought were principled believers in limited government or constitutional originalism - or steadfast adherents to a strict religious litmus test for politicians and policy - just aren't.
We believed they were because there are small groups of incredibly wealthy people who are these things, and who have been able to prevent an alternative from emerging - until now. Now that smokescreen has cleared. We can see that many people are not who we thought they were. They are something else entirely.
What? I'm not totally sure. Lots of different things. Let's just hope there's something in all that anger that can eventually be redirected towards good. One thing they are is cool with Trump's very unconservative economic views. Another thing they are is in open rebellion against neoliberal orthodoxy, the dominant socio-politico-economic ideology of our time, having finally figured out that its promised benefits will never reach them.
Those are reasons to hold out hope - assuming they can be weaned off the noxious xenophobia of Trump's right-wing populism/nationalism without losing those more open and flexible attitudes towards the structure of the economy and the role of the State, attitudes which the conservative establishment has successfully smothered for a generation.
If Trump loses the nomination and Sanders wins it, this group may prove a surprising source of defectors to the progressive - anti-establishment, anti-Washington-consensus - cause. If Trump wins the nomination, he may even start that weaning process himself among his own original base of supporters, in order to maximize his appeal in the general election. And when he (all but certainly) loses the election, there'll be a large block of GOP voters which, starting in 2017, could find a surprising home in a Democratic Party that manages to move away from present-day establishment orthodoxy. Even if that move is well to the political and economic left.
But that Democratic Party doesn't exist yet. It needs to be built from the ground up starting now. And that's precisely the movement that Bernie Sanders is leading.
If Trump is teaching us a fascinating lesson about right-of-center voters, Sanders is teaching an (almost) equally fascinating and complementary one about centrist and left-of-center ones. Namely, that no one has a goddamn clue what people mean when they describe themselves as "moderate".
Moderate Democrats are voting for Sanders. Conservative Democrats are voting for Sanders. Blue-collar Democrats are voting for Sanders. Independents are voting for Sanders.
Whatever "moderate" means in 2016, it does not preclude favoring a revolution to smash the stranglehold that neoliberal and neoconservative policy thought currently have on the ideas and agendas of both major political parties.
Nate Silver (unintentionally) said it best: What he - and everyone else, myself certainly included - don't get, could fill a book.
Tuesday, 9 February 2016
The Electability of Bernie Sanders
For the "Bernie can't win the independents" crowd:
This piece on his popularity with independents -
"Among independents [in Iowa], you, Bernie, were the runaway favorite--with 69 percent of the nonaligned voting for you, compared to 26 percent for Hillary, almost a 3 to 1 margin."
For the "Moderate/conservative democrats won't support Bernie" crowd:
This piece on his popularity with those groups.
For the "Conservatives will oppose Sanders even more fiercely than Clinton" crowd:
This piece on Sanders' intention to court Trump supporters; and
This piece on Trump's very unconservative economic populism; and
This piece on Clinton's unfavorability numbers relative to Sanders across all voters.
So: (1) data from independents; (2) data from moderate/conservative democrats; (3) strong arguments on where the substantial anti-establishment sector of the right will turn if (the, relatively speaking, economically liberal) Trump is eliminated; and (4) deeply entrenched negative views of Clinton relative to Sanders across the political spectrum point to the conclusion that Sanders is more electable than Clinton.
Now, to address the opposing argument from Vox and their 6 political scientists -
I was genuinely shocked by how poorly reasoned this is. The idea that the Republican nominee could successfully portray Sanders' health plan as a threat to what people already know is downright hilarious. What people already know at this point is Obamacare - and I would love, love, in a way I cannot express, to see the Republican campaign on "Vote Sanders and you might lose your Obamacare!" - and Medicare - which is why the Sanders plan is branded and marketed as Medicare for all. In fact, the loss aversion argument clearly goes the other way: it has now been long enough for a very large segment of the American people to grow accustomed to the actual benefits of Obamacare, and Republicans have dug themselves a hole much too deep to get out of by their implacable opposition to it in the absence of any proposal for a replacement or alternative. Whatever the public perception of the ACA, and whatever the significance of that perception - however distorted or misinformed it might be - in general, the Republicans have no "loss aversion" argument available to them, since their entire healthcare platform is based precisely on a promise to take something away which people currently have, and it is much too late, and they have much too much invested, for them to turn it into anything else at this point. That is true regardless of how many people recognize that what they now have is good for them compared to what they had in the past, or not. That point should be perfectly obvious.
The unstated assumptions in the rest of the piece are that 1) Rubio will be the nominee rather than Trump or Cruz (both of whom Sanders would crush); and 2) Rubio is a moderate like Romney. Maybe Rubio will be the nominee; but 2) is, again, laughable. He's slightly to the left of Cruz and Trump, yes, but he's a Tea Party candidate and incredibly extreme in absolute terms. In the general, he would in fact face the mirror image of Romney's devastating problem: Romney was a moderate who had to try to pass as an unhinged right-wing lunatic, but failed. The failure meant he didn't get the lunatic vote, but the attempt meant he lost moderate votes. Rubio is an unhinged right-wing lunatic who has to try to pass as a moderate. Since Democrats will be turning out in huge numbers in the general no matter who the nominee is, a Rubio victory would have to rely on a move to the center which wins over enough moderates/independents to offset the hardliners (the ones who would be more comfortable with Cruz) who will end up feeling betrayed by that move, and staying home.
Essential to that would be moving back to the center on immigration, which he can't easily do, because he has so publicly and enthusiastically abandoned his centrist position on that issue to be competitive in the primary. And the current and ephemeral illusion - because that's what it is - that he's already pretty close to being as moderate as he needs to be (while also being sufficiently conservative) is based solely on (1) not being Trump/Cruz; and (2) being the pick of big business and the Party establishment. (1) disappears in the general, and (2) doesn't help him that much with moderates/independents this year. That aside, the idea has to be that over the entire course of the general, the Democrats wouldn't be able to scare independents off him based on the rest of his actual, quite extreme, record. Not even I think they're that incompetent. Rubio can't win the general without moving to the center, and he can't win the general without not moving to the center. In other words, the Republicans have built themselves a primary system which currently makes it impossible for them to win the general.
The snag in that story is that if the Democrats nominate Clinton, Republican voters will go to the polls no matter who their own nominee is. Clinton would have to make that up with a big share of moderates/independents, and I'm not at all convinced that she would end up doing better with them than Sanders, because 1) she has major issues of trustworthiness with them; and 2) Sanders' leftism isn't hurting him with moderates/independents on anything like the scale many seemed to be anticipating in this election cycle. Sanders, moreover, can call himself a socialist, or whatever else he wants, and still won't need as many moderates/independents as Clinton because the vast majority of this country's die-hard conservatives won't be moved against him to the same extent that they will be against her. There is no one they could hate as much as they hate Hillary Clinton, and one of the most significant things we have learned about a sizeable portion of this group in this election year is precisely that they are anti-establishmentarians first, and evangelical Christians/rugged individualists/free-market disciples second. Sanders would actually pick up some of the anti-establishment vote in the absence of Trump - his radically different policy positions won't matter nearly so much as the fact that he's the only other candidate not taking big money and challenging the economic and political establishment head on - and in the presence of Trump, he wins easily.
This piece on his popularity with independents -
"Among independents [in Iowa], you, Bernie, were the runaway favorite--with 69 percent of the nonaligned voting for you, compared to 26 percent for Hillary, almost a 3 to 1 margin."
For the "Moderate/conservative democrats won't support Bernie" crowd:
This piece on his popularity with those groups.
For the "Conservatives will oppose Sanders even more fiercely than Clinton" crowd:
This piece on Sanders' intention to court Trump supporters; and
This piece on Trump's very unconservative economic populism; and
This piece on Clinton's unfavorability numbers relative to Sanders across all voters.
So: (1) data from independents; (2) data from moderate/conservative democrats; (3) strong arguments on where the substantial anti-establishment sector of the right will turn if (the, relatively speaking, economically liberal) Trump is eliminated; and (4) deeply entrenched negative views of Clinton relative to Sanders across the political spectrum point to the conclusion that Sanders is more electable than Clinton.
Now, to address the opposing argument from Vox and their 6 political scientists -
I was genuinely shocked by how poorly reasoned this is. The idea that the Republican nominee could successfully portray Sanders' health plan as a threat to what people already know is downright hilarious. What people already know at this point is Obamacare - and I would love, love, in a way I cannot express, to see the Republican campaign on "Vote Sanders and you might lose your Obamacare!" - and Medicare - which is why the Sanders plan is branded and marketed as Medicare for all. In fact, the loss aversion argument clearly goes the other way: it has now been long enough for a very large segment of the American people to grow accustomed to the actual benefits of Obamacare, and Republicans have dug themselves a hole much too deep to get out of by their implacable opposition to it in the absence of any proposal for a replacement or alternative. Whatever the public perception of the ACA, and whatever the significance of that perception - however distorted or misinformed it might be - in general, the Republicans have no "loss aversion" argument available to them, since their entire healthcare platform is based precisely on a promise to take something away which people currently have, and it is much too late, and they have much too much invested, for them to turn it into anything else at this point. That is true regardless of how many people recognize that what they now have is good for them compared to what they had in the past, or not. That point should be perfectly obvious.
The unstated assumptions in the rest of the piece are that 1) Rubio will be the nominee rather than Trump or Cruz (both of whom Sanders would crush); and 2) Rubio is a moderate like Romney. Maybe Rubio will be the nominee; but 2) is, again, laughable. He's slightly to the left of Cruz and Trump, yes, but he's a Tea Party candidate and incredibly extreme in absolute terms. In the general, he would in fact face the mirror image of Romney's devastating problem: Romney was a moderate who had to try to pass as an unhinged right-wing lunatic, but failed. The failure meant he didn't get the lunatic vote, but the attempt meant he lost moderate votes. Rubio is an unhinged right-wing lunatic who has to try to pass as a moderate. Since Democrats will be turning out in huge numbers in the general no matter who the nominee is, a Rubio victory would have to rely on a move to the center which wins over enough moderates/independents to offset the hardliners (the ones who would be more comfortable with Cruz) who will end up feeling betrayed by that move, and staying home.
Essential to that would be moving back to the center on immigration, which he can't easily do, because he has so publicly and enthusiastically abandoned his centrist position on that issue to be competitive in the primary. And the current and ephemeral illusion - because that's what it is - that he's already pretty close to being as moderate as he needs to be (while also being sufficiently conservative) is based solely on (1) not being Trump/Cruz; and (2) being the pick of big business and the Party establishment. (1) disappears in the general, and (2) doesn't help him that much with moderates/independents this year. That aside, the idea has to be that over the entire course of the general, the Democrats wouldn't be able to scare independents off him based on the rest of his actual, quite extreme, record. Not even I think they're that incompetent. Rubio can't win the general without moving to the center, and he can't win the general without not moving to the center. In other words, the Republicans have built themselves a primary system which currently makes it impossible for them to win the general.
The snag in that story is that if the Democrats nominate Clinton, Republican voters will go to the polls no matter who their own nominee is. Clinton would have to make that up with a big share of moderates/independents, and I'm not at all convinced that she would end up doing better with them than Sanders, because 1) she has major issues of trustworthiness with them; and 2) Sanders' leftism isn't hurting him with moderates/independents on anything like the scale many seemed to be anticipating in this election cycle. Sanders, moreover, can call himself a socialist, or whatever else he wants, and still won't need as many moderates/independents as Clinton because the vast majority of this country's die-hard conservatives won't be moved against him to the same extent that they will be against her. There is no one they could hate as much as they hate Hillary Clinton, and one of the most significant things we have learned about a sizeable portion of this group in this election year is precisely that they are anti-establishmentarians first, and evangelical Christians/rugged individualists/free-market disciples second. Sanders would actually pick up some of the anti-establishment vote in the absence of Trump - his radically different policy positions won't matter nearly so much as the fact that he's the only other candidate not taking big money and challenging the economic and political establishment head on - and in the presence of Trump, he wins easily.
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